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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FUTURE OF THE COMMo LAw. 1937. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge.
This book consists of a reprint of the principal addresses and a few of
the discussions of these addresses given at the "Conference on the Future of
the Common Law" held at Harvard Law School on August 19-21, 1936. This
conference was the principal Law School activity of the Tercentenary celebra-
tion of Harvard University, and was attended by a large number of invited
guests, mostly of the legal profession.
The principal addresses, which are printed here, are (following the order
in which they were given): "What is the Common Law?" by Dean Roscoe
PouInd; "The Common Law and the Civil Law in the British Commonwealth
of Nations" by Sir Maurice Amos, Quain Professor of Comparative Law,
University College, London; "The Common Law in Its Old Home" (Eng-
land) by Lord Wright, Master of the Rolls; "The Common Law in the
United States" by Mr. Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court;
"The Common Law in Canada" by Justice Henry H. Davis of the Supreme
Court of Canada, and "The Common Law in Ireland" by Justice Henry Hanna
of the High Court of Justice of the Irish Free State. It will be noted that all
of these addresses, except the first, have a definite geographic context. It should
also be noted that the address of Sir Maurice Amos omits any detailed con-
sideration of those parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations dealt with
specifically by other speakers-that is England itself, Canada, and Ireland.
The key-note of the entire conference was set in the address by Dean
Pound. The question which forms the title of his address is obviously a most
difficult one to answer; but it would be hard to find anyone more capable of
doing this than Dean Pound. His answer is in substance that common law is
a taught tradition-and a tradition of judging rather than administering. It
follows that, unlike the situation in the Civil Law, the chief oracles of the
common law are the decisions of judges; and statutes, administrative decisions,
and theoretical writings, while all important, are still subordinate. Such a
tradition naturally presupposes a doctrine of the supremacy of law-one of
the very few settled doctrines in our polity. Dean Pound very definitely
expressed the belief that despite the vigorous attack upon the common law now
in progress, especially in this country, it will survive, just as it has survived
several other equally vigorous attacks in past centuries. It may be noted that
Dean Goodrich of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, whose informal
remarks are reported later in the book, apparently agrees with Dean Pound
on this point.
Next came the address of Sir Maurice Amos. As a student and teacher of
comparative law, he is well fitted to compare and contrast the Common Law
and the Civil Law as they appear in various parts of the British Common-
wealth of Nations. It is noticeable that the Common Law technique has made
important inroads even in countries basing their law on the Civil Law pattern.
Thus, he pointed out that Scotland follows the "Roman" law system; yet in that
country the decisions of the courts are based upon precedent nearly as much as
in England itself. However, the speaker did point out one important advantage
which the Civil Law seems to have; it is less formalistic and, therefore, more
adaptable than the Common Law. As an instance of this, he cited the doctrine
of "ultra vires," which, it is well known is at least theoretically more rigid
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in England than in most jurisdictions in this country. Sir Maurice believes
that this greater rigidity of the Common Law is due to the fact that it is
younger than the Civil Law. Certain it is that legal history shows that undue
formalism in law (as perhaps in other things) is a disease of youth.
Lord Wright, the next speaker, is a conservative in politics and apparently
in temperament; but he is well known as a liberal, almost a radical, in legal
theory. In this address he did not emphasize very much his well-known
opposition to the whole doctrine of consideration in contracts; but he did
attack vigorously what he regards as the unsatisfactory state of the English
law with regard to quasi contracts. Here, too, the English situation, as evidenced
especially in the cases growing out of the coronation of King Edward VII, is
highly unsatisfactory. While the American law is probably somewhat better,
it would hardly be claimed that it is beyond criticism, .especially in its distinc-
tion between mistakes of law and fact. On the other hand, the assertion of
Lord Wright that the concept of the "reasonable man" is an unadulterated
fiction, and his advocacy of the complete repeal of the statute of frauds with
respect to the sale of goods, are certainly far more questionable.
Certain comments of Lord Wright as to the state of English law are
especially interesting. He expresses the opinion that although law and equity
are still administired by separate branches of the High Court of Justice, yet
the two now constitute a single set of principles. His assertion that statutes
have hardly reduced the bulk of case law would perhaps be discouraging to
those persons who believe that all legal difficulties can be solved by codifica-
tion; but it seems clearly correct. An American lawyer would be especially
impressed by the opinion of Lord Wright that the English courts generally
adhere pretty rigidly to common law principles where the rights of the subject
are concerned; in other words that our Bill of Rights is essentially a part
of the law of England though there not expressed in a written constitution.
Finally, most people will agree with Lord Wright that the most important
function of the legal system is to do justice. However, Lord Wright is too
good a lawyer not to know, and too honest a man not to confess, that the
problem of doing justice according to law is not only an ethical but an
intellectual and practical problem of the utmost difficulty.
Next came the address of Mr. Justice Stone. Much of it was taken up
with expressing his feeling that in this country individual rights are unduly
protected, and that administrators should be trusted much more than they are
by the courts. It may perhaps be said that this opinion will not be unanimously
concurred in in the light of our experiences within the last few years. Probably
more complete agreement will be reached with Mr. Justice Stone's lament as
to the unsatisfactory handling of statutes by common law courts, especially in
this country.
The address of Justice Davis was an interesting summary of the legal
situation in Canada. That country largely adheres to the Common Law
system. It is well known, of course, that the province of Quebec has always
followed the Civil Law derived from France. But Justice Davis points out
that even in Quebec the Civil Law is confined entirely to private law matters;
there, as elsewhere in Canada, public law is based upon common law concepts.
Even more interesting to the American lawyer is his showing that the lack
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of a due process clause in the fundamental law of Canada is far from an
unmixed blessing.
Next comes the address of Justice Hanna, who tells us of the legal situation
in Ireland, and especially in the Free State. He pointed out that Ireland has
always had its own common law derived rather directly from the Normans.
This Irish species of common law, having considerable differences from the
English type, survived rather vigorously "outside the Pale" until at least the
time of Queen Elizabeth; and it has considerable survivals even yet. But on
the whole, since Elizabethan times Ireland has been dominated largely by the
principles of the English Common Law. This is still true, even in the Irish
Free State. To be sure there is no appeal from the Free State courts to the
English Privy Council; but Justice Davis had already pointed out that the
same situation now exists in Canada.
This completed the main addresses except the one of Judge Crane, which
will be later considered. Several, but not all, of the informal speeches,
denominated "remarks," are also included in the book. Of these probably
the most important is that by Dean Goodrich which has already been referred
to. He also pointed out the very limited scope of laboratory methods in the
study of law in action. This may be very unfortunate but it is indisputably
true that society cannot be put into the laboratory and experimented with in
test tubes.
The Indiana lawyer may, however, be most interested in the remarks of
Hon. Walter E. Treanor, then a judge of our Supreme Court. Judge Treanor
introduced his remarks with some rather amusing antiquities of Indiana law.
But his particular emphasis was upon the idea that the doctrine of "stare
decisis" is not a rule of law but merely one of practice. This seems entirely
sound, and is no doubt a very helpful touchstone. However, his idea that the
supremacy of law does not in any way require that the judges have the last
word, is certainly more questionable. He asserted that the supremacy of the
judiciary is an unknown idea in any country except the United States; but
admitting this, it still seems true that it is pretty largely a fact in all common
law countries. No doubt Parliament is supreme in England in a way that
Congress is not in this country; but in England as in this country the courts
really do have the last word.
Finally, in the conference and in the book, is a rather informal but impor-
tant address by Hon. Frederick E. Crane, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
of New York on "The Spirit of the Common Law." This excellent summary
of the whole point of view and hopes of the conference is well worth reading
in detail; but perhaps it and the whole conference may be adequately sum-
marized in its last sentence:
"A patient hearing, a conscientious decision, a willingness to make new.
law for new conditions, is the life of the common law which in its advance
and growth will sweep into its jurisdiction the conflicts of nations as well as
the disputes of individuals."
Robert C. Brown.
Indiana University
School of Law.
